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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GARY J. XANTHOS,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF SALT
LAKE CITY,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF OPPOSING
RESPONDENT'S PETITION
FOR REHEARING
Case No. 18333

Defendant and
Appellant.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~->

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal originated from a final judgment from the Third
Judicial District Court, Judge Kenneth Rigtiup presiding.

The

district courts conducted a trial de novo on Respondent's request
for, plenary relief from a Board of Adjustment's decision declining to ,grant a variance, for the continuance of a nonconforming
building.~·The

district court,.after reweighing the evidence

before the Board

together ·over objection with evidence not

before the Board, reversed the· Board and,·granted the desired
variance.

The Respondent or "Board" appealed.

After briefing, argument, and deliberation, this Court
issued its written opinion on May 1, 1984 reversing the district
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court on the law and after applying that law to the facts,
reversed and reinstated the Board's decision.
The Respondent now seeks the Court to reconsider its decision, not facially on the law, but on its application of the law
to the record.

The Board opposes that motion and moves the Court

to deny the petition for rehearing.
PREVIOUS DISPOSITION BY THIS COURT
On May 1, 184, this Court handed down its written decision
in the above-entitled matter after full briefing, argument,
debate, and consideration by the Court.
major elements:

(1)

That opinion had two

the establishment of the applicable

standard of review and procedures governing judicial review of a
Board of Adjustment decision under Section 10-9-15, Utah Code
Ann., and (2) the application of those standards to the
particular facts in this case.

The Supreme Court reversed the

district court on both elements because it had improperly assumed
the powers to conduct a trial de novo on the facts.

It assumed

all powers of the Board by reweighing the facts according to its
own values and felt at liberty to substitute its own judgment and
priority of public policy.
The principles of the standard of review clearly established
for district courts to follow in Board of Adjustment cases
arising under said Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. seeking
"plenary action for relief" clearly include:
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(1)

Board decisions like those other zoning

administrative bodies "should be allowed a comparatively wide
!attitude of discretion": and

(2)

"their actions are endowed with a presumption of

correctness- and validity": which

(3)

"the courts should not interfere with unless it is

shown that there is no reasonable bas is to j_ustify the act ion
taken. n 1

(4)

"The judicial review is not to he a retrial on the

merits" 2 or reweigh the evidence and the court is not allowed
to substitute its-judgment for that of Board."
(5) .r::.:

"The· role of the district court in reviewing· the

Board of Adjustment's decision is to determine whet_J:ier the
action taken was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary ,or capricious.

In order to make that·' determination, the district

court may take additional evidence, but. it must be related to
the issues that were raised and considered by the-Board. 113
Having -clarified the- law, which had not . . been

respect~d-

in

this case by the district court that_conducted a trial de novo

1Page 3 - of Supreme Court• s Decis:ion -of May 1, 1984 i_n --the abqve
case, hereinafter "Deci-sion of May 1 , 1984" 1 ci-ting--Cottonwood
Heights Citizens Ass'n·--v. Board of Commissioners, 59-3. P.2d 138,
140 (1979).
2 necision of May 1, 1984 at page 3.

3 Id.
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and assumed the power of the Board to reweigh policy and the
facts, the Supreme Court properly proceeded to apply the correct
law to the record.
The Court correctly perceived that the district court had
asserted its own individual judgment prioritizing the retention
of low income housing regardless of zoning considerations.

In

doing so it had erred, and that error could and was properly
corrected by the Supreme Court looking to see if there was a
reasonable basis for the Board's decision.

The Court noted that

perhaps evidence in the record could have supported the district
court•s,decision, had it had the authority to reweigh and balance
according to its own values.

But the court held it was not the

court's prer~gative to weigh the evidence anew~
"However it does not matter whether the judge agrees or
disagrees with the rationale -of the Board or the-, policy grounds upon which a decision is based.· It does not lie
within the prerogative of the trial court to substitue
its judgment for that of the.Board where the record -discloses a reasonable basis for the Board's decision."
Id. at page 6.
Having the record before it as issue in controversy, the
supreme Court applied the correct law in its review.

It found

"the record in this case clearly reflects, that the Board of
Adjustments action was not arbitrary or capricious and that there
was a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it."
The dissenting opinion disagreed, not with the Court's
statement of the law, but with the application of the law to the
facts.

The dissenting opinion's main thesis that the majority
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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opinion erred in its perception of the facts by giving greater
deference to the Board's decision than it did to the district
court.

The dissent gave and argued the Court should give

deference to .. findings cited by the district court, but failed to
address the tainting impact of the district court's error in
substituting its judgment and values upon its findings.

In

reliance on the district court's findings, the dissent would have
estopped the Board from enforcing the zoning ordinances.
DECISION SOUGHT.ON REHEARING

Respondent, in effect, desires the majority to adopt the
dissenting opinion.

Appellant asks the

~<;>_urt

to

dismis~,

the-

Respondent's Petition and affirm its decision of May 1, 1984 in
all re·spects.
ARGUMENT
POINT. I.
-THE COURT; DID NOT ERR IN ITS DECISION OF MAY 1,
1984 AND SHOULD DENY RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
REHEARING.
A.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION MERELY REARGUES ITS CASE
AND THE DISSENTING OPINION.

The ·argume-nts raised.,· by Respondent were briefed, argued .and
specifically considered by the Court in the opinions of the
decision of May 1, 1984.

In support of Respondent's motion,·for

rehearing, Respondent urges that· the Supreme- Court erred, when in
applying the law to the facts of this case,- -it found that there
was ample evidence in the record to support the Board of
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Adjustment's decision and thus was not arbitrary nor capricious.
Respondent suggests that because there is evidence in the
record as reweighed by the district court to support the latter's
decision, that the Supreme Court is precluded from reversing for
it must give deference to the district court findings under the
traditiona~

doctrine of limited appellate review.

That issue and

Respondent's position is not new, it is merely reargument. 4

It

is the thesis of the dissenting opinion 5 and is one which this
prevailing opinion specifically considered and rejected when it
determined the scope of judicial review is to refrain from
substituting "its judgment for that of the Board where the record
discloses a reasonable basis for the Board's decision. 116
This holding of law conforms to the well reasoned law of
similar cases and should be affirmed.

The holding was adopted

after complete briefing, argument and consideration but disagreement in a strong dissent.

It is a holding with which it can be

expected the Respondent as a defeated party, together with the
dissenting author, would not agree.
long-established and worthy

poli~y

But in accordance with the
of this court, mere

disagreement does not provide an appropriate ground to justify a

4Respondent's Brief Points I{D) and II, Appellant's Brief, Point
I and {C) in particular.
Soecision of May 1, 1984, dissent at page 9.

6ra.,

majority opinion at p. 4.
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rehearing •

Duchene au v. House , 4 U. 2 9 2 , 9 P • 6 1 8 ,

v. House, 4 U. 484, 9 P. 619 (1886); Cunnington v.

( 18 8 6 ) , Jones
Scott,~ U.~,

9 P. 619 (1886).

B.

THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DECLINED TO
EXTEND A PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY TO THE DISTRICT
COURT'S FINDINGS, BUT REVIEWED THEM MERELY FOR
THE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT.

Respondent and the dissenting opinion suggest the Supreme
Court erred in failing to give proper deference to the district
court's findings.

As discussed

generall~ 7

~hove,

that issue is

not new, was briefed, argued, and unsuc9essfully raised in the
dissent and rejected. 7
Respondent now_ further suggests

th~t

after conducting the

trial as a matter of original jurisdiction and substitut_ing, its
own values prioritizing low cost housing over other _valid zoning
objectives, the district __ court also concluded that the Board_' s
decision was arbitrary and capricious, that the latter statement
can be extracted from {its setting untainted by the district

:c

court's fundamental errors.
The Court properly discerned that candici. refusal of the
district court to extend a presumption of validity tq J:he Board's
decision and correspondingly limit its scope of judicial review
inherently tainted the- entirety of its actions, precluding the

7 Appellant's Brief, Point I & (C) in particular, Respondent's
Brief, Point I(D) and II, argument, .and.. t_he dissenting_,opinion.
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Supreme Court from deferring to or relying on the district
court's findings and conclusions. 8

When such error and abuse of

judicial power occurs, the matter must be remedied by Supreme
Court intervention.

Otherwise, the error becomes perpetuated and

insulated; the primary safeguard of judicial restraint becomes
meaningless, and the district courts become super boards of
adjustment.
The tainting error of a district court's failure to apply
the appropriate limited scope of review cannot be expunged by
asking if there is evidence to support the erroneous decision,
but to properlv review the evidence in the favor of the Board.
This Court proper!.. ,, fulfilled its duty by conducting the
review under the scope of analysis that should have been applied
at the district court level.
the Board's

action~?

This

Was there a reasonable basis for

Cour~

did not substitute its judgment

for that of the discretion of the trial court for the discretion
is not vested in the district court but in the Board.

There is

nothing to suggest how this court or individual justices might
have voted had they been members of the Board, and they carefully
declined to give that appearance.

Obviously this was and remains

a case over which reasonable parties could and do disagree.
In reversing on the facts, the Court correctly cured the
errors in the same manner as courts reaching the same conclusion
8 oecision of May 1, 1984 at page 4.
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in other similar matters have done and should do.

Rickard v.

Fundenberger, 1 Kan App. 2nd 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977).
C.

THE- RECORD SUPPORTS A REASONABLE BASIS FOR THE
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT DECISION. THE COURT DID NOT
ERR IN ITS ANALYSIS OF THE RECORD.

The issue as to whether the record provides a reasonable
basis to support the Board decision -when analyzed from the
correct scope of judicial review has been °in controversy in every
phase of this appeal--in briefing, argument and opinions.
disagree, but the court, after

careful:~

People.

consideration, has found.

the "record clear1y·'reflects 119 there· was a reasonable basis and
has·· ruled in the Board's favor.;

That- ruling should be aff i-rmed

without reservation or further rehearing.
· -R:~spondent cites a series of a selected few of;-; the Supreme
Court•s·statements t:hat it'believes are not-consistent with the
record; but in actualfty are only-inconsistent~with its Il1YOpic
percep.tion of· tho·se

facts~

Individ-ually- -and collectiv-ely· _,the

- discrepancies are·' non 'existent or insignif,icant . :to cthe totality
of

the~·record

decisioh·s.

befo-re the Court;c-.and upon which- it based ..i.ts .

It is simply unpersuasiv_e- _reargument: at bes-t--and

·:_.,~'"~unabashedly" self serving and selective--ornitting acknowledgemen~.

of all the facts sup.porting· the_ -Board's decision.
Specifically:
( 1)

-·-(·

As to the argument that the· "special circumstances"

9 Decis ion of May l, 19 84 at p. '4.

-9-
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reauired for a variance is satisfied by the 3-year
period
~

between issuance of the duplex permits and the enforcement
action.

This simply demonstrates Respondent's misunderstand-

10
.
.
d espite
.
.
b rie
. f ing
.
.
ing
o f t h e requirement-prior
on th e issue
and the Court's decision. 11

The Court correctly and speci-

fically held on page 5 that "the property itself contains
some special circumstances relating to the alleged hardship."
The Court properly ruled that such circumstances were missing
in this case.
(2)

Respondent attacks-the Court's statement-that the

City was not made aware during the application and approval
process that structure was being used as a dwelling.
However, it cites·absolutely no authority in the record other
than the existence of the plat plan showing an existing
structure.

Seeing astructure that,is in position and-a size
0

smaller than proposed carports situated on an alley in a
parking lot (Exhibit D-31) attached to an application
disclosing there are no dwellings on the lot outlined within
the project and scope of permit does not equal disclosing the
use would be for a dwelling.

The Court was properly

persuaded that ambiguous disclosure of an existing building
which looks and would be legal if it were used as a garage or
lOAppellant's Brief, pages 25-29.
1 1necision of May 1, 1984 at pp. 5-6.
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storage shed is not equivalent to disclosure of an extra unit
exceeding the number for which approval was given.
{3)

Respondent suggests there· is no admissible evidence

to support,; the Court's view that the City, during construction, had no reason to believe the structure was used as a
dwelling.

Seeing a structure that looks the size,

S~?tpe,

position, characteristic of a garage does not disclose its
undisclosed use as a dwelling.

The testimony of the b9ilding

inspector that he . . saw· the building "which

look~d

like

an·~:old

building" provEis·· ·he saw it but doesn't prove he knew or even
considered it was being

:~sed

as a dwelling.

In·fact, on

September 30, 1975, it is and wa-s true according to the
testimony of Mr. - Xanthos· that it was not being so used.
·Mr. Peguillian's testimony

as to the· information he

received from his· supervisor who was training hill\,
offered as under res

gestae"·~excepti.on

It"was admissible· to prove that
.,.,~..-;.,;'struct-ure

was~"-,

to the heresay rule.

when''~'inquiring-

about the

received} an::,:chi'swer that induced: ·him to believe that

the building>would be removed..

The statement.,, may or ..,n:tay·· not

have been true, perhaps· Mr-. Lawson ,lied· to. ·Mr·•::' Peguillian.
But the statement· is significant for it was made by a·-person:
who· had reaso:ri"'to be familiar with the *project:, who was· in a
special position of authority to require removal, who would
have known. the significance it would make· to the· new
inspector, and ·who knew the action it would" reasonably induce
-11-
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Mr. Peguillian to forebear.

(R-385-389).

It does adequately

support the Court's position.
Contrary to Respondent's view, the non-heresay testimony
of Mr. Peguillian that he observed "the older building over
in the corner, set out there by the alley" (R-388) does not
suggest he knew or believed it to be used as a dwelling.
( 4)

Respondent errs and confuses the evidence.

It

states Mr. Peguillian first visited the project site in May
of 1975 (a time Mr. Xanthos testified he occupied the
structure as a dwelling.)

A close reading of the record (R-

385-389) discloses Mr. Peguillian testified he was hired in
May of 1975.

(R-384).

from Mr. ·Lawson (R-385).

Later in July, he received the area
The first _time he inspected the

duplexes was when he went out with Mr. Lawson to do a finalinspect ion (structural) ._for-a certificate of_ occupancy.

His

initialed date of the inspection was September 30, 1975.

(R-

387 and Exhibit 21D-(6).

(5)

The Court did not conclude that the structure was

not occupied during construction as suggested, _but that- City_
inspectors had no reason to believe it was being used as
dwelling because the-n. they had no reason to believe it was
not the garage or storage shed it appeared to be.

This

doe~

conform to the record.
(6)

Certificates of occupancy are dated April 23, 1975

and correspond to the time an owner requests final inspec-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tions to begin.

Mr. Blair explained in the record inspec-

tions occur upon request after that date, but the
certificates are not given out until after all final
inspections have been completed·and the last being the
building inspection. -·(_Exhibit 23-P and R-223) _ Consequently,
Mr. Peguillian's testimony is consistent with the documentation of the record and decision of· this Court.
(7)

Respondent's characterization of the Court's

statement that the ·s·tructure was never :listed as a residence
with the City is inaccurate.

This Court stated "there was

evidence that structu:te was never listed as an independent
residence in the City records, did not have an .:assigned
address and did not have authorized water, pewer or
electrical service."

That is

true~

Exhibit 21-D and

testimoni.;es of Mr. :B-lair and _Mr. Hafey.
( 8 l ·! Respondent makes note tha>t.. at court the building
plans could not be produced by the City but omits noting that
·'

it couldn,.'t..produce them eith~r, even though it produced old
bills, tax notices, contracts, etc. related to the property
and proj.ect.

It also '.omits mentioning that the property

owners did work. without required penni t, removed buildings
without.permit, and changed . - tt:ie.

~ddresses

it .-p.laced._on

t~e.

units in the field :adding to the confusion in- redords.
Regardless of the· number of errors al1-eged, they
knit picky and are larg'ely inaccurate.

~are

simply

It is simply symptomatic
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of Respondent's tenacious unwillingness to accept the fact that
others, including the Court, can view the facts differently than
they would like them to.
Whether considered separately or in their totality, the
allegations of error are insubstantial, meritless and are much
ado about notping.

The petition for rehearing upon them. should

be dismissed for what it is--unconvincing reargument.
POINT II
REMAND IS NOT NECESSARY, IS CONTRARY TO THE
INTERESTS OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY.
As a last-ditch effort to avoid enforcement of the Board's
decision affirmed by this Court, Respondent begs

for-.a~remand.

The remand is not necessary and is, in light of the detailed
review of the record by the Court, inappropriate.

This is not a

matter where the trial court has original jurisdiction to weigh
the evidence in light of its own interpretation of the ordinance
and public policy.

Consequently, the district court has no

unique function that - cannot and --has not been performed by the
Supreme Court.

The decision is final, and should remain so.

In

the interest of judicial economy, the parties and courts should
-be spared of unnecessary additional burdens.
CONCLUSION
The Respondent's petition is completely based on issues and·
facts already correctly considered by this Court.
reechoes the concern of the dissenting opinion.

Basically, it
At best, it is
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blatantly repitious self serving reargument that did not
prevail.

The supposed errors cited as the grounds for rehearing

either aren't errors at all or are completely insignificant
minutia.
The principal holdings on the law are not objected to
directly.

Respondent instead objects to the proper application

of them by the Supreme Court.

There is no other body better able

to conduct the limited appellate review in light of the appropriate standards this Court has established.
There is nothing in the petition which gives any valid
reason to consider the Court's decision.

Therefore, the

appellant believes the petition should be dismissed, that the
significant, well-reasoned decision by the Court of May 1, 1984
should be affirmed to provide guidance to the district courts of
this state to avoid future error.
Respectfully submitted this

c::L(

day of June, 1984.

cm90
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